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Abstract
The African Union (AU) has achieved much in conf lict management 
through its ad hoc approach to peacekeeping. Rather than contend on 
how to make this approach more effective, African conf lict scholars and 
bureaucrats are now favouring and focusing on the African Standby Force 
(ASF) and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Conf lict 
(ACIRC). The debates often laud these mechanisms as necessary for 
effective peacekeeping in Africa without assessing if they can really get 
the job done. This paper queries the competency of these mechanisms in 
achieving stability in conf lict areas and asks if they can really be more 
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effective than the ad hoc approach? This article contends that emphasis should 
rather be on improving the ad hoc approach than on the operationalisation of 
the two new mechanisms. This paper argues that the ad hoc approach has had 
major successes. The newly established mechanisms, though yet to be tested, 
will be ineffective in keeping the peace due to their major structural defects.
Keywords: conflict, peacekeeping, African Union, ad hoc approach, contingent 
character, force integrity, complementarity, subsidiarity
Introduction
The African Union (AU) has come a long way in providing security on the 
continent. Despite its flaws, it has changed the face of peacekeeping and proven 
itself able in addressing conflict. The AU has built a sturdy reputation in conflict 
management through the use of the ad hoc (or context-specific) approach to 
peacekeeping. However, extant peacekeeping literature is replete with analysis 
of the AU’s two new conflict management mechanisms namely the African 
Standby Force (ASF) and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to 
Conflict (ACIRC). While the attention given these conflict mechanisms is 
understandable, given that they are novel, this paper assesses their ability to 
achieve stability in conflict areas when compared to the ad hoc approach that 
has worked so far.
The ASF and the ACIRC are usually presented in peacekeeping debates as 
necessary for effective peacekeeping in Africa as though it has to be one or the 
other, or both. Authors, such as Romain Esmenjaud, Malte Brosig, Norman 
Sempijja, and Jason Warner, argue for the ACIRC (Esmenjaud 2014:172–177). 
Others, such as Peter Fabricius and Andre Roux, favour the ASF (Fabricius 
2013; Roux 2013). But both sides fail to question the necessity and efficacy 
of these mechanisms. This paper raises these issues and argues that emphasis 
should be on improving the ad hoc approach rather than the operationalisation 
of the ASF and ACIRC that will be ineffective in stabilising conflict areas due 




The literature review establishes the importance of contingent character to the 
effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. By ensuring missions are robust in size 
and boast high levels of force integrity (greater troop homogeneity, less troop 
diversity), the AU’s ad hoc approach can achieve consistency in delivering 
effective peace operations. The chance for success is higher when robust forces 
with high levels of force integrity are deployed.
The cessation of violence and provision of security serve as this study’s 
working definition of success. For this reason, emphasis is on the military 
aspect of peace operations since they shoulder the responsibility of security. 
Peacekeeping literature is short on discussions of force integrity for military 
effectiveness. To augment for this shortfall, interviews conducted in 2014 with 
Brigadier James Ellery of the British Army and Colonel Tony Curtis, a US 
military adviser to the AU were used.
Literature review: AU peacekeeping mechanisms and the 
role of contingent character in mission effectiveness
Since the creation of the ACIRC in November 2013, authors have either lauded 
the initiative or advocated for it to be scrapped. While recognising the reason 
for the creation of the ACIRC and acknowledging the challenges that lie ahead, 
Esmenjaud (2014:173) points out that the ACIRC ‘operates on a reservoir of 
5 000 troops, with operational modules in the form of tactical groups of 1 500 
personnel. With a minimum initial autonomy of 30 days, those units must 
be able to deploy rapidly within a maximum period of ten days’. The reason 
for adopting this model, as noted by Esmenjaud, was to enable the ACIRC to 
deploy in an immediate manner. He concluded that the ACIRC was not just a 
response to the AU’s inertia in Mali, but it was also an opportune adaptation 
(Esmenjaud 2014). Apparently rapid deployment was regarded as a more 
important objective of the ACIRC than effectiveness. But what good then is it 
to rush into battle and then realise you are ill-equipped to handle it?
Brosig and Sepijja argue that the ACIRC can and should be a force 
complementing that of the ASF. But working together is being prevented 
by various factors, such as opposition of some member states, funding gaps 
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and integrating the ACIRC into the AU’s existing security structures. They 
argued that, through its continent-wide reach, the ACIRC makes up for a 
major shortfall of each ASF Force that can only deploy within its sub-region. 
The ACIRC therefore provides the AU with a continental instrument that fills 
the gap created by the lapses of the ASF (Brosig and Sempijja 2015).
Jason Warner contends that the ACIRC will not infringe on the performance 
of the ASF and identifies three areas where they differ. First, the ACIRC fulfils 
only one specific gap of the ASF’s mandate, namely its rapid deployment 
capability. So it does not serve as a wholesale replacement. Secondly, the ASF 
and ACIRC differ in troop size and they differ on how troops will be drawn for 
combat. Thirdly, both are to be funded differently. While the ASF is funded 
largely by AU member states and the African Peace Fund, individual member 
states will primarily fund the ACIRC. Warner argues further that since the 
ACIRC does not impede the development of the ASF, the ACIRC is a laudable 
stopgap mechanism for continental rapid deployment (Warner 2015). 
Contrary to Warner, Solomon Dersso (cited in Jobson and Smith 2014) warns 
that – considering the funding capacity of the AU – focus on the ACIRC would 
draw attention and funding away from the ASF (also see Fabricius 2015). Andre 
Roux (2013) contends that a regionally controlled ACIRC would undermine 
the ASF forces. Some others contend that considering many African states such 
as Nigeria were opposed to the ACIRC, and that more than half of the member 
states default on their payment of annual dues to the AU, asking member states 
to incur the additional expense of footing the bill of the ACIRC alongside the 
ASF will be asking too much.
There is still considerable confusion about how exactly the ASF and ACIRC 
relate to each other, for as Comfort Ero (cited in Jobson and Smith 2014:4) 
notes, the fundamentals are not very different for both of these forces. 
Fabricius (2013) notes that whatever structure is put in place will require 
that countries provide the capacity for it. He observed that there were plans 
in 2015 of subsuming the ACIRC into the ASF, but this was avoided to save 
face. A major challenge of the ACIRC is that funding is largely dependent on 
individual member states, and the lack of political will that pervades the AU 
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has kept the ACIRC grounded since it was conceived. Roux (2013) queried the 
existence of the ACIRC which he termed a ‘duplicate structure’ (Roux 2013:2). 
He argued that ‘although Africa and the AU have long needed such a capability, 
it is essentially a duplication of the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) 
which is structured within the AS … The glaring question is why a duplicate 
structure is considered necessary?’ He noted that the critical enablers lacked 
by the ASF, such as medium and heavy airlift capacity to rapidly deploy, would 
also be faced by the ACIRC. He averred that focusing on bringing the RDC to 
full operational levels within the ASF would make more sense than running a 
new independent structure (Roux 2013).
These views reflect the position of most authors on the issue. AU peacekeeping 
literature has focused on comparing both mechanisms with the intention 
of justifying or debunking the need of the ACIRC to run alongside the ASF. 
In arguing for the complementarity or duplication of these mechanisms, authors 
indirectly accept and endorse these mechanisms without first examining if 
they really stand a chance of improving peacekeeping and providing stability 
in conflict areas.
There are multiple factors that contribute in varying measure to the effectiveness 
of peace operations. These include: funding which oils the peacekeeping 
machinery; international political will which provides legitimacy for the 
operation and sustains mission capacity; mandate which dictates the conduct, 
sphere and objective of the operation; mission leadership which determines the 
level of troop discipline and civil-military relations; training of peacekeepers 
which determines troop professionalism; timing of intervention which impacts 
on the number of lives saved; and mineral resources of the conflict area which 
influences the intensity of the conflict (Jett 2001; Cocodia 2018).
While the ACIRC and the ASF are influenced by some of these factors, contingent 
character, which comprises the size and composition of peacekeeping military 
units, is a factor that both mechanisms are lacking. When a peacekeeping 
contingent is lacking both in size and force integrity, the likelihood of failure is 
high (Cocodia and Paki 2016:60). The following sections of this review bring 
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to the fore the importance of contingent size and force integrity, and why 
without them peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are likely to fail.
The size factor 
Since the majority of violent conflicts from the end of the cold war have been 
intrastate conflicts, authors in support of robust peace operations are of the 
view that these are better settled with some degree of force (Walter 1997:336; 
Donald 2002:21; O’Hanlon 2003:10; Holt and Berkman 2006:93–94; Williams 
2010:3). When intervention has been approved, it should be done with a large 
contingent to project force credibility (Walter 1997 and 2001; Dobbins et al. 
2005). Supporting this position, Michael O’Hanlon (2003) and Hultman, 
Kathman and Shannon (2013) asserted that though a smaller number of 
elite soldiers can sometimes handle discreet tasks, the broader problem of 
stabilising a country requires significant forces. For such stability operations 
and difficult missions, a modest intervening force will need an average of one 
soldier for every 200 members of a country’s civilian population (O’Hanlon 
2003). In some cases, the recommended ratio is 1:50 or 1:100 (see Chivvis and 
Martini 2014).
The reason for this is to ensure that intervening forces are ‘comparable in 
number to the largest likely internal foe they might face. With comparable 
numbers, as well as superior skills, mobility, and firepower, intervening forces 
will be well placed to dominate the ensuing battles’ (O’Hanlon 2003:31). 
Similarly, Dobbins and others (2005:232) point out that peace operations 
with lower force-to-population ratios have been accompanied by much 
higher casualty levels, and missions with high casualty levels are usually the 
least successful. Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman noted that ‘an operation 
with too few forces could limit assistance to civilians outside specifically 
identifiable areas or exclude those in neighbouring towns’. So, ‘once a decision 
for intervention is reached, it is preferable to send forces promptly and in 
decisive quantities’ (Holt and Berkman 2006:76). ‘Such an approach conveys 
resolve, discourages resistance and improves the odds of success’ (O’Hanlon 
2003:10). This is reaffirmed in the United Nations (UN) report which states 
that, ‘no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability 
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to project credible force’ (United Nations General Assembly and Security 
Council 2000:1).
The size of peacekeeping contingents certainly matters in addressing conflict. 
Based on this premise, entrusting the provision of security in a war torn area 
to just 5  000 troops is as good as preparing a mission for failure or making 
the conflict drag on. Michael O’Hanlon (2003) and James Dobbins and 
others (2005) argue that the broader problem of stabilising a country requires 
significant forces. For such stability operations and difficult missions, a modest 
intervening force will need an average of one soldier for every 200 civilians. 
In some cases, a ratio of 1:50 has been proposed (Dobbins et al. 2005). 
In line with the larger troop to civilian ratio (1:200), a 5 000 strong ASF will 
be effective in keeping the peace in an area with a population of 1 000 000 
people. The ACIRC, in deploying 1 500 troops at any given time, will be 
effective in conflict areas with approximately 300 000 people. Considering that 
even the smallest states in Africa boast of populations four times this number, 
it is difficult to conceive these forces being effective in stabilising conflict areas. 
The AU’s peace operation in the Comoros in 2008 that was brisk and effective 
had a peacekeeper-civilian ratio of 1:185. The mission in the Central African 
Republic (CAR), as at 2016, had a ratio of 1:593, and stability has been elusive 
since conflict broke in 2013 (Cocodia 2018:86 and 184).
Large contingents are not only necessary to ensure military victories or force 
the peace in arenas of uncooperative factions, the size of a contingent also 
enhances its peacekeeping role as a sturdy assurance mechanism and provides 
credibility to peace settlements (Williams 2010:3–5). On the various debates 
why civil strife often seems intractable, one line of thought contends that it is 
as a result of each faction being sceptical of the other reneging on negotiated 
settlements. In the absence of a guarantor powerful enough to ensure that they 
abide by the rule, the parties keep fighting (Walter 1997:340).
The force integrity factor 
Large however does not necessarily translate to effectiveness in military terms 
and this is clearly expressed by military experts. For a military unit to be 
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effective there must be force integrity. Force integrity exists when troops share 
several aspects in common, such as language, religion, culture and background 
(Cocodia and Paki 2016:46; Cocodia 2018:27). A deficit in force integrity exists 
when a contingent is made up from many Troop Contributing Countries 
(TCCs), giving rise to diverse modes of operation and interests which hinder 
effectiveness (Hardt 2010:151; Pavšič 2013:3). Just as sharing language, 
culture, religion and values bond people, difference in these areas can create 
numerous obstacles ranging from acceptable meals to gender discrimination. 
It becomes difficult and expensive creating a cohesive force from widely 
disparate nationalities (Feldman 2008). Cultural and social diversity within 
units do not augur well for mission efficacy. This becomes worse when certain 
units share cultural and religious affiliations with spoilers within the mission 
area (Forsberg 2008; Zirker 2008). Peacekeeping units will find it difficult to 
develop a common doctrine, and common systems, tactics, techniques and 
procedures. This is because greater diversity reduces the bond that motivates 
the coordination of troops to achieve set goals (Lee 2005:84–85).
A classic example is the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) that had 19 500 troops from 47 countries as at 2015. With 
just four of these TCCs contributing over a thousand troops and the majority 
contributing less than two hundred, it was one of the most ineffective peace 
operations run by the UN/AU in Africa from its inception in 2007 (Cocodia 
2018:151). Petra Pavšič noted that these diverse backgrounds have been a barrier 
for UNAMID’s units (Pavšič 2013:3). The low degree of literacy alongside 
culture and religious variance made cohesion difficult (Feldman 2008:268–
269). And as observed by Daniel Hampton (2014:2), ‘poor cohesion of the 
collective is a recurring constraint to sustainable peacekeeping capability’ 
There is the contention that as the number of actors contributing resources 
increases, contributor-specific benefits become more diluted. This encourages 
free-riding and generates higher mission shortfalls, because having a larger 
number of contributors reduces the marginal gains for a country of adding 
one additional troop to the mission. The point made here is, as the number of 
TCCs increase, mission deficits also increase (Passmore et al. 2018:5).
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Drawing on these arguments and the relevance of contingent character to 
achieving mission objectives, this article makes a case for the relative success 
of the ad hoc approach of the AU and why the ACIRC and the ASF will be 
ineffective.
Limitations of the ASF
The operationalisation of the ASF was planned for 2008, but deferred to 2010, 
and then to 2013 and to 2015. Security experts were unsure that the force 
would be operational before the end of 2015 (Okeke 2016:97). This fear was 
confirmed by Ibrahim Gambari, who in leading a panel assessing the readiness 
of the ASF in 2013, told the AU that the force will not be ready by its deadline of 
2015 (The African Report 2014). A major reason given for this setback was the 
unpreparedness of the North and Central forces owing to a lack of cooperation 
and instability within member states (Ani 2018). The forces of the other three 
regions, West, East and South, had purportedly reached operational status. 
However, the 2012 conflict in Mali showed this to be untrue as the ECOWAS 
Standby Force (ESF) could not be deployed for lack of readiness. So if after 
fourteen years of planning the ASF was finally declared operational in February 
2016, yet lacking its RDC which was the major reason for its conception, then 
the rationale for its existence ceases.
The RDC deficit of the ASF has robbed it of any justification as an effective 
replacement for the ad hoc approach. Arguably, the ASF’s premature 
operationalisation was a strategy by the AU to propitiate its donors in view of 
the fourteen years and over US$1 billion invested in it. In reference to funding 
the ASF, Plaut (2014) notes:
The United States lavished money on what was described as the African 
Peace and Security Architecture providing $500 million to train up to 
50,000 African troops. British involvement was also substantial, with more 
than £110 million a year being invested via the African Conflict Prevention 
Pool for nearly a decade. ‘As at December 2013’ the figure stands at £51.5 
million. The Pool is a joint initiative run by the Foreign Office, the Ministry 
of Defence and DFID.
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These donations are outside funds provided by other major partners – the EU, 
Germany and France. Given that such massive investments had to be justified, 
declaring the ASF fully operational was likely due to political pressures rather 
than field demands. In lacking its RDC, the major reason for its existence, the 
time and resources put into the ASF were not worth it.
One reason given for the delay of the ASF was that each of the 5 000 strong 
regional forces had to be combat-ready for the ASF to get operational. 
The excuse was that the delay by the north and central regions to establish 
standby forces frustrated plans to activate the continental force (The East 
African 2013). This excuse was tenable in the years immediately following 
inception of the ASF in 2004 when the ASF forces were designed to operate 
outside their Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The excuse however 
ceased to matter from the moment the ASF planners earmarked each brigade 
to deploy only within its region. In view of this revised concept of operations 
(CONOPS), what happens when conflicts occur in the northern and central 
African regions where the forces are not ready? On this score, the ad hoc 
approach whose flexibility allows contingents to be deployed anywhere on 
the continent, has the advantage. This is evident from the AU’s ad hoc peace 
operations that have been conducted in West, East and Central Africa.
Even when conflicts occur in regions with operational forces, where the RECs 
have control over the ASF forces within their jurisdiction, the ad hoc approach 
has the advantage of gaining more international recognition than the ASF. 
This situation was borne out of a suspicion that the AU was wielding too 
much power and has been a source of friction between the AU and its RECs 
(see Roux 2013). A case in point is the February 2013 peace operation in Mali 
where political tensions between the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the AU contributed significantly to the three-month 
delay in deploying peacekeepers. Though ECOWAS had promptly devised an 
intervention plan when the conflict broke out in Mali, the UN mandated it to 
be an AU mission. This led to the formation of the African-led International 
Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) which was under the control of the AU but 
later became the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (Cocodia 2018:128). This experience shows that 
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the major actors on the continent are more comfortable dealing with the AU 
than with its RECs.
The decentralisation of command and autonomy of the regional forces count 
as advantages of the ASF in consonance with the arguments of burden sharing 
and of knowing the terrain and politics of the area better (Møller 2005:5). 
However, the ad hoc system which is more flexible, less complex and centrally 
run with less interference from RECs is still more attractive as it can also 
ensure that troops solicited and deployed are mainly from within the region 
of the conflict area. AFISMA is a case in point, as the bulk of troops deployed 
were from West Africa.
Connected to the last point is the issue of subsidiarity. A major aim of the 
subsidiarity principle is to regulate the powers of the central authority in 
relation to its units, thereby giving priority to the units. The responsibility to 
take action is passed to the centre only when there is certainty of its greater 
efficiency or when the unit has shown its inability to deliver. Subsidiarity 
has been proposed as the main principle for governing inter-institutional 
relationships between the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
of the AU and its RECs. This relationship consists of three facets: decision 
making, division of labour and burden sharing. Though the idea of division 
of labour and burden sharing is attractive, there is a lack of consensus within 
the AU on how this is to be implemented (De Sousa 2013:1). This has been 
a major issue with the ASF ever since it was conceived. In contrast however, 
the ad hoc approach where command is centralised in the AU is free of the 
drawbacks of subsidiarity and inter-institutional hegemonic tussles (Cocodia 
2016:11–12). Ad hoc operations cut the RECs out of the decision making cycle. 
‘It also makes it easier for the AU to deploy troops because they are deployed 
at the behest of the AU Peace and Security Council’ (AUPSC) (Curtis 2014).
Limitations of the ACIRC
The fourteen AU member states that signed up to establish and support the 
ACIRC are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. 
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The formation of the ACIRC was prompted by the failure of the ASF in 2012 to 
deploy in Mali and stop the advance of the rebels from the north of the country 
toward the capital Bamako. Proponents of the ACIRC argue that it was created 
to complement the ASF. The concept of the ACIRC is based on a reservoir 
of 5 000 troops operational as tactical combat units of 1 500. Each combat 
unit is comprised of three infantry battalions, an artillery support group and 
light armour elements, as well as an air wing of 400 troops (Warner 2015:60). 
Any of these combat units of 1 500 troops can be deployed at any one time 
within 14 days of mandate authorisation to curtail the violence in conflict 
areas pending when a larger contingent can be deployed (Roux 2013).
The ACIRC since its inception in May 2013 has been greeted with mixed 
reactions from academics, bureaucrats and field/military experts. Colonel 
Tony Curtis states:
When the AU first made this new concept public and briefed it to the 
Ministers and the Chiefs of Defence prior to the AU summit, the idea was 
slammed. The Ministers and Chiefs did not like it … but lo and behold, 
they have the actual AU summit, they bring it up to the presidents, and the 
Heads of State overwhelmingly approve of it. They approve something their 
Chiefs and Ministers rejected (Curtis 2014).
The Gambari Report which gave life to the ACIRC recommended that it could 
run alongside the ASF. This report provided the middle ground as it aimed to 
pacify the Chiefs of Defence of AU member states and their Heads of State. 
Such political compromise was against the expectation that ‘the Commission 
would go in and look at the ASF and the ACIRC, compare them, evaluate them, 
contrast them and then make a determination on which one was the better 
course of action’ (Curtis 2014). So, the ACIRC was borne more out of political 
compromise than conflict realities. 
The political undertones behind the formation of the ACIRC have not served it 
well and this has created resistance within the AU to its deployment (Fabricius 
2013). Financing the ACIRC has always been questioned and the Kaberuka 
proposal, aimed at improving internal funding within the AU, will be unable 
to address this issue. The Kaberuka proposal advocates imposing a 0.2% tax on 
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imports coming into the continent with the view that the internally generated 
revenue will enable the AU to finance 25% of the cost of its peace operations by 
2020 (African Union 2016; UNSC 2016). Challenges facing the implementation 
of this proposal include: the uncertainty of funding by member states through 
their central banks; the political will to see it through if more than half of the 
AU member states default on the payment of their annual dues. A majority of 
states are already defaulting on the payment of this levy (Institute for Security 
Studies 2017). What further compounds the issues, is the assertion by the 
World Trade Organisation and the US that the levy is illegal and contravenes 
international trade rules (Mwai 2017; Apiko and Aggad 2018). In the face of 
these obstacles, it is hard to see how funds from the Kaberuka proposal can be 
used to finance the ACIRC.
The structure of the ACIRC points to a deficit in force integrity, given its wide 
diversity and small combat units. An intervention force made up of troops 
from a region will possess stronger bonds than one composed of small troop 
contingents from different regions. On this score, the flexibility of the ad 
hoc system gives it the advantage that it can secure troops from the region 
or neighbouring states with the goal of fostering force integrity. Unlike the 
ACIRC, the ad hoc approach affords the advantage of increased knowledge of 
local conditions through deploying troops from neighbouring countries. 
Even if the ACIRC were ready to deploy, it will only offer short-lived respite at 
best. Military personnel connected with its development have acknowledged 
gaps in funding and strategic airlifts. Brigadier Chris Gildenhuys (2016:1) 
notes that the ACIRC ‘should be able to intervene in a robust way and sustain 
operations for at least 90 days when an AU or UN force will take over to bring 
about sustainable peace and stability’. If the AU force referred to is the ASF, 
there are no guarantees it would be ready to take over from the ACIRC since 
its capacity for rapid deployment will remain out of reach for the foreseeable 
future (De Albuquerque 2016). If an ad hoc arrangement is meant to relieve 
the ACIRC, it queries why the ad hoc mechanism was not primed to deploy 
at the start in the first instance. Banking on a UN takeover leaves too much 
uncertainty. The UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) took over from the 
African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 67 days after the scheduled date of 
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25 March 2004. Twelve years into peacekeeping in Somalia, the UN is yet to 
take over from the AU. On issues of practicability, the unpredictability of the 
model is a major flaw (Lotze 2016:82). The uncertainty on what happens after 
the 90-day sustainability period of the ACIRC challenges the workability of 
this project.
The relative success of ad hoc missions
The ad hoc approach to peacekeeping simply consists in soliciting troops from 
willing member states to address conflicts anywhere on the continent. The AU 
has been quite effective at peace operations using this approach. Apart from 
the AU’s peacekeeping misfortune in Darfur and CAR, it was quite effective 
in Burundi, Comoros, Somalia and Mali. In these missions, size and force 
integrity were integral to their outcomes (Cocodia 2018:65, 86 and 108).
Contingent character and the effectiveness of the AU’s ad hoc 
approach 
The table below provides a strong rationale for large contingents which 
neither the ASF nor ACIRC are, but which the ad hoc approach conveniently 
accommodates. The reason for sizeable contingents is to ensure that intervening 
forces are ‘comparable in number to the largest likely internal foe they might 
face. With comparable numbers, as well as superior skills, mobility, and 
firepower, intervening forces would be well placed to dominate the ensuing 
battles’ (O’Hanlon 2003:31). Operations with too few troops stand the risk of 
suffering high casualty rates, and such operations are often among the least 
successful (Dobbins et al. 2005:232). The experience of AMIS and UNAMID 
present good examples, as one of the greatest obstacles to their success was 
the inadequate size of the contingents (The Guardian 2009). If at mission 
peak with 19 555 troops, UNAMID was unable to provide security in Darfur, 
the more difficult job of stabilising conflict areas with contingents as small 
as those provided by the ASF and ACIRC is impossible. Beyond providing 
security, a shortage in troops also limits assistance to civilians, especially 
those outside specifically identifiable areas, and this contributes to instability. 
Table 1 provides data on size of contingent and force integrity of the AU’s peace 
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operations. Size is measured using troop-civilian ratios, and force integrity is 
measured using force size as against the number of TCCs.









































































































































































































































































































Troop Size 3 000 19 555 1 500 21 524 11 400 9 350
No. of 






























































Successful = Meeting basic mission objective of providing security and 
creating stability. 
Unsuccessful = Unable to meet basic mission objective.
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Table 1 shows that the missions with the following peacekeeper-civilian 
ratios: MAES, 1:185; AMISOM, 1:217; AFISMA, 1:140, were successful. 
This indicates that missions with low troop civilian ratios have a higher 
propensity for success. Inversely, peace operations with high troop-civilian 
ratios are likely to fail as depicted by UNAMID, 1:1 000 and MISCA, 1:492. 
Though, the result for AMIB, 1:2 300 deviates significantly from this 
trend, this exception is explained by the high level of force integrity that 
AMIB enjoyed. ‘AMIB was made up of 56 percent South African troops 
and 34 percent Ethiopian troops with Mozambique making up the rest’ 
(Cocodia 2018:66). AMIB possessed a high level of force integrity since 
South Africa and Ethiopia are English speaking countries which ensured 
that the language hurdle was overcome.
Considering the role of contingent character in the successes of AMIB, 
AMISOM, MAES and AFISMA, it is evident that UNAMID and MISCA 
failed because of poor planning and certain local constraints, and not from 
any defect of the ad hoc approach (Cocodia 2018:169–170 and 189–191). The 
success of the ad hoc approach in the intense conf lict theatres of Burundi 
and Somalia shows that it can address conf lict anywhere on the continent 
so long as the international political will exists and proper planning is done 
with contingent character taken into consideration. 
Ad hoc AU peace operations are f lexible on contingent size and can be 
enlarged or reduced in response to ground realities. The impact of this asset 
is maximised when TCCs deploy their troops in concentrated numbers 
to a mission rather than spread them unevenly over several missions. In 
2016 for example, Senegal had 2 227 troops serving in UNMISS and 795 in 
UNAMID. UNMISS would have been better served with 3 000 troops from 
Senegal, while UNAMID would have had one less component undermining 
its force integrity. 
Surprisingly, force integrity has escaped due attention in peacekeeping 
literature, yet it matters as a major factor in military operations. James 
Ellery, a retired Brigadier of the British Army who served as Head of the 
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UN Missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, 
and as Chief of Staff in the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, comments:
Size is important, but if you make up a troop contingent with many 
nations it is much weaker … You have obviously got difference in language, 
logistics, fighting, method, all sorts of things. For example, there is an EU 
force … and it is made up theoretically of all the nations of the EU ... that 
is hopeless! Nobody understands what is going on. There is a level below 
which you must not mix troops. I personally think that level is brigade. 
Brigade is between 3–5 000 troops, they should be all Nigerians or Kenyans, 
or Bangladeshi … So a brigade, 5 000 then commanded by a brigadier. 
That is very effective, no problem at all (Ellery 2013).
With the military size of many African states it will be difficult for TCCs to 
meet this number of troops for peace operations. However, it is necessary 
to come as close to it as best possible. The importance of force integrity 
to peacekeeping outcomes is aptly captured in the composition of AMIB’s 
2 860 troops where South Africa contributed 1 600, which was 56 percent of 
the contingent. If lessons are to be learned on factors that facilitate effective 
peace operations, the f lexibility of the ad hoc approach that enables it to 
expand or reduce its numbers as dictated by situations of the ground make 
it the more practical peace operations machinery. The AU’s mission in 
Somalia is a good reference point.
Contingent character and the effectiveness of AMISOM 
In terms of how effective a large contingent with the resolve to get the 
job done could be, the AMISOM experience makes a strong case for 
numbers, but it makes a strong case for force integrity as well. As AMISOM 
troop strength increased and maintained force integrity in the process, 
Al-Shabaab was pushed out of Mogadishu and the surrounding areas, 
thereby stabilising the area (Mills 2014).
AMISOM struggled to make any impact during its first four years for several 
reasons. One of these reasons was the size of its contingent as countries 
were slow, and reluctant to deploy their troops (Williams 2013). Up until 
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September 2010 AMISOM had just 7 200 troops made up largely of troops 
from Uganda. Though outmanned by the spoilers, the mission did not cede 
ground as force integrity ensured the mission was sturdy. By December 
2010 AMISOM increased its troops size from 8 000 to 12 000 and Ugandan 
soldiers accounted for 1 800 of this reinforcement, while Burundi sent 
in 1 000 (Hiiraan Online 2012). Force integrity was preserved alongside 
contingent size as Uganda and Burundi alone accounted for three quarters 
of the additional troops. With both these factors taken care of, AMISOM 
was able to improve on its provision of security. With significant increases 
in its troop strength from 2011, AMISOM began stamping its authority on 
the Somali landscape (table 2 shows AMISOM’s troop distribution as at 
January 2015).
Table 2. AMISOM’s troop distribution per TCC as at January 2015
Troop Contributing Country Troop Strength Assignment Area
Uganda 6 223 Sector 1
Burundi 5 432 Sector 5
Ethiopia 4 395 Sector 3
Kenya 3 664 Sector 2
Djibouti 960 Sector 4
Sierra Leone 850 Sector 2
Source: AMISOM, www.amisom-au.org
The improved provision of security had multiplier effects. It spurred the 
United Nations Security Council in January 2012 to authorise a further 
increase of AMISOM’s troops to 17 731 (Reuters 2012). It forced the 
streaming out of foreign fighters from Al-Shabaab (African Union Press 
Release 2014). It also encouraged the US to step up efforts in training and 
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equipping AMISOM troops through its African Contingency Operations 
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme (Curtis 2014).
Ad hoc approach and international support 
There are several military initiatives undertaken by partners of the AU 
directed at improving its capacity to meet the demands of security on 
the continent. These initiatives include ACOTA and the European Union 
Training Mission (EUTM). ACOTA was established by the US in 1997 to 
train soldiers in peacekeeping. Through this programme, the AU has had 
a steady supply of skilled peacekeepers for its ad hoc missions without 
having to expend the resources required in maintaining standby forces. 
The US partnered with 25 African countries and trained over 248 000 
peacekeepers through the programme (US Africa Command 2012). 
Colonel Curtis (2014) states: ‘It is a programme that we use to ensure that 
troop contributing countries participating in AU missions are adequately 
trained and equipped to accomplish the task that they are being sent to 
accomplish’. Similarly, the EUTM has bases in Mali, Somalia and CAR. 
Its major objective is to contribute to the EU’s effort in advising, teaching 
and training the Armed Forces of these countries and strengthen their 
ability to contribute to the defence of their territory and the protection of 
their own population. Through these missions, the EU seeks to stabilise 
countries facing state weakness caused by intrastate conf lict. Doing this 
in partnership with the AU, they help the organisation meet its security 
objectives on the continent.
Other externally aided programmes include the Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
where its 2014–2017 road map gives top priority to peace and security and 
emphasises support for AU peace operations (Fourth EU-Africa Summit 
2014). There is also the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel whose security 
objective is to strengthen and operationalise national, sub-regional and 
regional security mechanisms capable of addressing cross-border threats. 
(UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel 2013:5; Ambrosetti and Esmenjaud 
2014:77–80). 
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The support of these partnerships has bolstered AU expertise in yielding 
results through its ad hoc approach. Contrary to the belief that a standby 
force will allow for smoother and more effective AU peace operations, the 
complexities involved in getting these standby forces operational have 
made them cumbersome. When the ASF could not be deployed in Mali on 
3 January 2013, it took the AU less than 14 days using the ad hoc approach 
to get boots on the ground by 17 January 2013. This proves that the ad hoc 
approach is capable of rapid deployment. All it needs is some fine-tuning 
and the political will to make this characteristic a regular feature of AU 
operations.
For all the ado about the ASF and the ACIRC, the AU’s time-tested ad 
hoc approach to peace operations still remains the better option. The ad 
hoc approach might have its operational hiccups, but it is devoid of the 
structural contingent character deficit of the ASF and ACIRC and is still 
the more reliable approach to get the job done. Rather than focus on the 
compatibility or otherwise of the ASF and ACIRC, emphasis should be 
on making the ad hoc approach more effective and a starting point could 
be in ensuring that each deployment is adequate in size and sufficient in 
force integrity. 
Conclusion
This paper argues for the sustenance and development of the time-tested 
ad hoc approach to assembling PKO contingents. In as much as the ad 
hoc approach to troop recruitment for peace operations has proven 
itself effective in stabilising conf lict areas, the AU should concentrate on 
fine tuning strategies to make this approach more responsive for rapid 
deployment. Rapid deployment worked in Mali with the recruitment and 
deployment of troops under AFISMA. So, rather than take pride in drafting 
grand plans that become a burden to execute, or that lack the capacity to 




As it stands, the ASF and ACIRC are rather products of political 
contrivances than practical combat units designed to effectively address 
conf lict realities on the ground. The ad hoc system, despite its lapses, has 
been an effective conf lict management mechanism. Its setbacks have been 
due to poor planning rather than inherent f laws. What the ad hoc approach 
needs to be more effective is a sturdy political will and better planning that 
ensures robust contingent character.
The capacity of the ad hoc approach to accommodate contingents no 
matter how large, gives it a major advantage over the ASF and the ACIRC. 
The capacity to be deployed anywhere on the continent sets it apart from the 
ASF, and its ability to be sufficient in force integrity gives it the advantage 
over the ACIRC. It is never too late for the AU to retrace its steps on the ASF 
and the ACIRC and improve on its ad hoc strategy.
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